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Why do governments recognize rights? In this article, we rely on
natural experiments and an innovativematching technique to identify
a new causal mechanism of policy feedback, which we refer to as the
“recognition” effect. We rely on the “hard case” of health care to
demonstrate that attitudes towards the health system change in
response to government policy change and, indeed, even to rights‐
based initiatives. During the time when public opinion surveys on
public satisfaction with the health system were in the field,
governments in both Germany and Sweden introduced a new right:
the right to a maximum waiting time for health services. This seren-
dipity allowed us to compare respondents' attitudes both before
(control) and after the implementation of the waiting time guarantee
(treatment), using coarsened exact matching to account for the imbal-
ances in the treatment and control groups. We find that respondents
interviewed after implementation of the newwaiting time guarantees
(in contrast to those interviewed before the introduction of the guar-
antees) express higher levels of satisfaction with the health system in
general, but do not evaluate their specific medical treatment (includ-
ing waiting times) more positively. We interpret this finding as
evidence that citizens respond to governmental recognition of their
rights as a good per se, independent of their personal experiencewith
the particular public service at hand. Thus, we argue that theories of
policy feedback need to move beyond their focus on direct material
experience with the policies at hand, and to incorporate mechanisms
of symbolic action and normative valuations into their causal models.
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BURLACU ET AL. 8811 | INTRODUCTION
Although welfare state politics since the 1990s have often revolved around austerity and retrenchment, governments
do not solely cut back social services, but instead also aim to improve them. In the health care area, improvements in
patient rights are a growing trend in public policy‐making (Fountain, 2001; Segal, 1998; Winblad, Vrangbæk, &
Östergren, 2010). Indeed, rights‐based policies are common in social policy, such as for example, the right to a day
care place, the right to adopt a child, or the right to opt‐out of government health and pensions plans. But do citizens
notice and give governments credit for these new rights? Or do they wait and see in order to develop judgements
about whether these new rights have, indeed, brought about any material improvements in their direct experience
with the public service at hand?
The ways in which citizens judge and react to government policies is of central importance not only for social pol-
icy and administration, but also for our understanding and appreciation of representative democracy, more generally
(Bingham Powell, 2004; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995). Indeed, there is a great deal of scholarly debate on the
impact of policies on public opinion. Dynamic representation scholars argue that public opinion reacts very quickly to
changes in government policies, and, indeed, that politicians in turn change policies directly after swings in public
opinion. Policy feedback scholars argue by contrast that citizens' preferences are endogenous to past policies, and
are shaped by long‐term policy patterns as well as short‐term policy shifts. Despite this division, however, both sides
of this debate share a common assumption that citizens evaluate government policies based on their direct experi-
ences with policies. Thus, both policy responsiveness and policy feedback scholars view citizens' evaluation of govern-
ment policies as a matter of rational calculation and self‐interest. By contrast, “deservingness” theory roots
differences in support for government policies as resulting from normative, and possibly affective and primordial, pro-
cesses that govern the development of political and societal attitudes. Consequently, health attitudes should remain
relatively invariant.
Efforts to sort out the precise links amongst welfare state attitudes and policy feedbacks are undoubtedly ham-
pered by the very difficult methodological problem of determining the directionality and causality of the relation-
ship between policies and attitudes, particularly in the health area. Fortunately, data from Germany and Sweden
provide us with a unique opportunity to contribute to this puzzle by an analysis of opinion change after the imple-
mentation of one specific rights‐based reform—a waiting time guarantee for health services—in two countries at
two different points in time (2005 and 2016). We analyze this natural experiment by relying on targeted surveys
and a quasi‐experimental design. We are able to show that persons asked about their satisfaction with the health
system overall were more positive after the introduction of the waiting time guarantee than before. When asked
about their satisfaction with waiting times or medical services, however, they showed no response to the introduc-
tion of the waiting time guarantee. From the perspective of instrumental rationality, this is not surprising. The intro-
duction of the waiting time guarantee did not immediately reduce waiting times. Thus, there is no reason to expect
higher satisfaction with waiting times or medical services. Despite the lack of increase in satisfaction with specific
aspects of the health services, respondents nevertheless reported higher levels of satisfaction with the health sys-
tem in general. Given the importance of the concept of generalized diffuse legitimacy in theories of political legit-
imacy (Easton, 1967), we interpret these findings as evidence of a symbolic or normative effect of policy feedback.
When asked about their satisfaction with the health care system in general, individuals seem to base their
judgments on substantive rationality; when asked about their satisfaction with specific aspects of the health
system, they seem to frame the question in terms of instrumental rationality (Weber, 1978 [1968]). The public
appears to appreciate being recognized as sovereign citizens with rights—indeed, without regard for individuals'
personal utilization of this new right or any immediate material improvement in public social service delivery.
Furthermore, they update their attitudes towards the health system, even though these attitudes are often consid-
ered as quite stable. This “recognition1 effect” is relevant not only for health policy and governance, but also has
important implications for the literature on policy feedback and policy responsiveness, as well as the literature
on welfare state attitudes.
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As argued in all of the articles in this regional issue, public support is a key issue for the political legitimacy and fiscal
sustainability of welfare states, but scholars remain divided about the causes and consequences of public opinion on
welfare state policies. Policy responsiveness theory (Brooks & Manza, 2006a, 2006b; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson,
2002; Stimson et al., 1995) argues that changes in public opinion have a direct effect on public policies. As politicians
are aware that they risk losing votes in the next election if they do not adjust their policies accordingly (e.g., by
increasing social spending), these theories posit that public policy will follow public opinion very closely. However,
once politicians have re‐adjusted these policies, the public is thought to “reset” its opinion. If social expenditures have
just been increased, the public will reduce its support for further increases. If, instead, cutbacks have been undertaken,
the public should prefer social expenditure increases. This adjustment of public opinion to changes in government pol-
icies has been termed the “thermostatic” effect (Bartle, Dellepiane‐Avellaneda, & Stimson, 2011; Soroka & Wlezien,
2010; Wlezien, 1995).
Policy feedback theorists, on the other hand, criticize policy responsiveness theory precisely for assuming such a
smooth and seamless dynamic equilibrium. Given all of the intricacies and contingencies of public policy‐making, pol-
icy feedback scholars argue that it is unreasonable to assume that politicians will instantly adjust their policies in
response to changes in public opinion (Cammett, Lynch, & Bilev, 2015). Furthermore, policy feedback scholars argue
that pre‐existing policies—many of which have been relatively stable for a long period of time, shape citizens' policy
preferences—and even their attitudes and behavior (Campbell, 2012; Shore, 2014). Indeed, this is precisely the original
claim of welfare regime theory, which argues that the patterns of solidarity embodied in different welfare regimes—
results of historic class compromises and political mobilization—become self‐reinforcing, a process sometimes termed
“institutional stickiness” or “path dependence” (Esping‐Andersen, 1990; Esping‐Andersen & Korpi, 1984; Pierson,
1994; Rothstein, 1998; Svallfors, 2012).
Deservingness theorists argue, instead, that welfare state attitudes have cultural roots, which are not necessar-
ily related to the particularities of welfare state regimes or policy feedback, and these scholars emphasize differ-
ences between policy areas rather than welfare state regimes. Van Oorschot argues that “Europeans share a
common and fundamental deservingness culture” of support for the sick and disabled because they are viewed
throughout Europe as being particularly deserving, as their illness is largely interpreted as being beyond their con-
trol (van Oorschot, 2006, p. 23). Jensen and Petersen (2017) go even further, arguing that the deservingness heu-
ristic is a biologically‐rooted response that shapes attitudes towards the sick and explains the widespread support
for governmental responsibility to care for the sick and high levels of government spending for health care. Conse-
quently, health care is generally speaking a valence issue in politics, as opposed to other policy areas, such as unem-
ployment. Thus, the deservingness literature suggests that health attitudes should be very resistant to change, and
does not really address cross‐national or inter‐temporal variation on health care attitudes. Larsen proposes a syn-
thesis by pointing out that the type of welfare state regime may be tapping into how social programs distinguish
between the deserving and the undeserving, thus changing how the public views the legitimacy of welfare state
recipients (Larsen, 2008).
Consequently, the great difficulty in sorting out the relationship between welfare state institutions and public
attitudes is precisely this endogeneity of welfare institutions and attitudes. Welfare state regimes may be shaping wel-
fare state attitudes, while differences in attitudes may be the cause of differences in welfare state regimes or differ-
ences across policy areas. Hence, in order to pinpoint how exactly policies affect the attitudes of individuals, current
cutting‐edge research has increasingly turned to inter‐temporal research designs. By examining changes in public pro-
grams, and the differential response of individuals directly targeted versus those who remain unaffected by policy
change, scholars hope to tease out the mechanisms of policy feedback. To date, they have discovered two key mech-
anisms: “visibility” and “proximity”. Visibility entails that individuals will react to policies only when they have access to
information about these policies, and find them salient. Proximity means that individuals react to policies at higher
rates when they (“direct users”) or their family members (“secondary users”) personally experience these policies.
BURLACU ET AL. 883Indeed, if individuals do not directly experience policies but hear about them only in the media, they may react to pol-
icies very differently from the direct and secondary users (Bendz, 2017; Hedegaard, 2014; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005;
Kumlin & Stadelmann‐Steffen, 2014; Mettler & Soss, 2004; Soss & Schram, 2007).
While this precision in locating mechanisms of policy feedback marks a decided improvement in the study of
welfare state attitudes, the field has gone into quite a rationalist and utilitarian direction, given its original con-
cerns about explaining differences in norms and values. Furthermore, it has neglected the process by which direct
experiences with welfare state programs generate broader political support for the welfare state. Indeed, the lit-
erature on political legitimacy emphasizes that legitimacy is not necessarily based on specific policies or actions of
government, but on a more general trust in government that is distinct from “short‐run evaluations of individual
incumbents and their policies” (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982, p. 244). We posit that there may be an interme-
diate level of generalized diffuse legitimacy—one that pertains to specific policy domains such as the health sys-
tem. General diffuse support for the health system may be a key stepping‐stone to developing and reinforcing
trust in government as a whole, and it could be of importance in explaining support for the welfare state. Policy
proximity alone does not explain how a utilitarian appreciation of a policy would spill over into a general moral
commitment to social solidarity more broadly. Further, given that welfare states entail a relationship between
program beneficiaries and the wider public, not just users but taxpayers need to support the welfare state; thus,
non‐users must eventually come to support social solidarity. Lastly, in thinking about politicians' motivations for
introducing reforms, the electoral pay‐off for policy changes that affect the diffuse support of broad sections
of the electorate would surely be more effective than ones that affect only the direct users. On all three counts,
generalized diffuse support provides a mechanism by which recognition of rights might increase broad support
for the welfare state. This does not preclude the possibility that persons who support the introduction of social
rights might not think they might at some point directly benefit from the new right. But we are suggesting that
this is a broader, more diffuse and more normative attitude that extends beyond personal self‐interest to
include support for the claims of others to these rights, and suggests approval of the way in which government
interprets its mandate. As such, this fits Weber's definition of substantive rationality as opposed to instrumental
rationality.2.1 | Hypotheses
In contrast to theories that focus on policy proximity and policy visibility as prerequisites for policy feedback effects,
we argue that citizens might well respond favorably to governmental recognition of their rights as a matter of princi-
ple. Access to health care is generally seen as a universal citizen right, and at the same time access is the Achilles heel
of many health care systems—amongst them the Swedish and the German. By launching waiting time guarantees, this
lack of fulfillment of a citizen right is recognized, and acted upon by the government. In line with the understanding
that the recognition of need or injustice is conceived as something intrinsically good, we hypothesize that this will lead
to more positive evaluations and higher satisfaction amongst the general public. Thus, we expect that individuals
would respond positively to the introduction of this new right, without necessarily having visited a medical facility
or experienced shorter waiting times. In addition, we expect that respondents can distinguish between issues of prin-
ciple versus issues of utility; waiting time guarantees appeal to their sense of substantive justice, shorter waiting times
and better service to their instrumental self‐interest.
These theoretical conjectures result in the following empirical expectations that are tested. First, we hypothesize
that respondents surveyed after the implementation of the waiting time guarantees will respond based on their nor-
mative beliefs, and will evaluate the health system as a whole more favorably than those surveyed prior to the imple-
mentation date. Second, when asked about specific aspects about the health system, however, respondents will
answer realistically, and will not respond positively to guarantees alone. Thus, we expect that individuals are able
to distinguish between their agreement with the principles expressed by government versus their evaluation of the
concrete public service provision at hand.
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This article makes use of two natural experiments. Waiting time guarantees were implemented in Sweden and Ger-
many during the period when two public opinion surveys were in the field. In Germany, Parliament passed the law that
introduced the waiting time guarantee on June 11, 2015, the law went into legal force on July 25, 2015, and the hot-
line procedure for obtaining an appointment with a specialist was advertised and opened—i.e., actually implemented—
on January 25, 2016. The German Socio‐Economic Panel Study Innovation Sample2 (which included a panel of ques-
tions on satisfaction with the health system of our own design) was in the field between September 8, 2015 and
March 4, 2016. Out of the total 2,500 respondents, 95% answered our questions of interest before the implementa-
tion date, and the remaining 5% afterwards. In Sweden, the waiting time guarantee was introduced through an agree-
ment between the Swedish Association of County Councils and the Social Democratic Government. It was
implemented on November 1, 2005, in the midst of field canvassing for the Swedish Society Opinion Media
(SOM)3 survey of the Västra Götaland Region (which includes Gothenburg and the surrounding area) between Sep-
tember 19, 2005 and February 22, 2006. In contrast to Germany, all Swedish respondents received the survey ques-
tions on the same date in September; 82% responded before the waiting time implementation date; the remaining
18% after the date.
In both countries, this constitutes a natural experiment set‐up, as a policy was implemented during the course of
surveys that were being carried out with no relationship to the policy. However, unlike a true experiment, there is no
experimental control over the treatment and control conditions, and respondents are not randomly distributed
between the two groups by the experimenter. In Germany, there is no a priori reason to believe that those questioned
before and after the treatment differed systematically; but owing to random chance, this might nevertheless be the
case. In Sweden, we can assume it likely that people who returned their questionnaires at the last minute differed
from those who returned them promptly. Thus, in both cases, these are not true experimental situations, but quasi‐
experiments, and we need to take measures to balance the distribution in the treatment and control groups, which
is described in more detail below.
Critically, we have evidence that these respondents were exposed to government information about the imple-
mentation of the waiting time guarantee, and hence have evidence of its visibility. Indeed, both governments relied
on new strategies of political communication. Despite both countries' long tradition of corporatist interest intermedi-
ation, these governments reached out directly to voters, publicizing this policy change throughYouTube videos, press
releases, and flyers delivered directly to individual households. The implementation of these guarantees was reported
in television news broadcasts and in national as well as local newspapers. Indeed, in both countries, much effort was
invested in disseminating information on the very day the reform was brought into force.4 In the Västra Götaland
region, for example, all households received information about the reform in the Regional government's magazine
Regionmagasinet, which was distributed to the households on or about the day the waiting time was brought into force
in Sweden. Perhaps even more importantly, the waiting time guarantee was featured in several articles in printed
media in Sweden on the day of implementation, not least in an editorial in the most important newspaper in the
region, signed by politicians from three different parties in the regional executive committee.5
Not only did the respective governments rely on visible and direct appeals to the public, but they also bypassed
established interests. Despite the criticism of health policy stakeholders, such as doctors, nurses, and local govern-
ment associations, both Christian Democratic Minister of Health Hermann Grohe in a grand‐coalition government
and Social Democratic Minister of Care and the Elderly Ylva Johansson in a Social Democratic minority government
pressed ahead with their reforms, making these a political priority. The German guarantee set up a hotline, such that
patients could be guaranteed an appointment with a specialist within six weeks. The Swedish reform guaranteed hos-
pital and/or specialist treatment within three months. Hence, logically speaking, the reductions in waiting time them-
selves could only be directly experienced at least six weeks or three months (respectively) after the implementation
date. Furthermore, subsequent surveys of waiting times demonstrated a lack of improvement in waiting times for spe-
cialist appointments in Germany,6 and an improvement of waiting times for hospital treatments in Västra Götaland,
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which might follow months after the survey period was over.3.1 | Dependent variables
In the German SOEP‐IS 2015 study, we use indicators of satisfaction with the health care system developed by the
authors. Respondents are asked to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the German health care sys-
tem as regards: (i) the health system in Germany in general; (ii) the availability of GPs; (iii) the availability of specialists;
(iv) the waiting time for an appointment with a physician; and (v) the waiting time for hospital treatment. For each of
these survey items, respondents were told to indicate their level of satisfaction on a 0–10 scale, where 0 was totally
dissatisfied and 10 was totally satisfied.
In the Swedish case, we make use of three survey items asking respondents to evaluate: (i) services provided by
the Västra Götaland Region; (ii) hospital care; and (iii) primary health care. Respondents could choose amongst five
categories: “very good”, “good”, “neither good nor bad”, “bad”, and “very bad”. Due to the small proportion of respon-
dents who said that the systems are “very good” or “very bad”, we grouped those together with answers of “good” and
“bad”, accordingly. Thus, the dependent variable is measured as a trichotomous variable indicating whether people are
dissatisfied, neither satisfied or dissatisfied, and satisfied. We consider the survey item measuring satisfaction with the
service provided by the Västra Götaland Region a good proxy of overall satisfaction with the health system because
80% of its budget goes to health care, and, in the eyes of citizens it is very much perceived as an organization respon-
sible for health care, although it is also responsible to some extent for regional development and public transportation.
The questions on primary and hospital care, by contrast, ask specifically about the satisfaction with the care provided
in your municipality, and are closer to the German survey's questions about satisfaction with specific aspects of the
health care system, such as primary care and hospital care.83.2 | Treatment variable
To assess the effect of the waiting time guarantee on satisfaction, we build a simple dichotomous variable indicat-
ing whether people answered the survey questions before or after the day the waiting time guarantee was imple-
mented. We code the variable 1 for those who answered after this day and, as such, have been “treated”.
Correspondingly, we code 0 for those who have indicated their satisfaction before the implementation date and
as such are in the “control” group.3.3 | Control variables
To rule out the potential influence of confounding from exogenous socio‐economic characteristics and possible
endogenous determinants of health satisfaction, we make use of a number of controls. Regarding socio‐economic
characteristics, we control for age, income, gender, marital status, number of children, education, and position on
the labor market. Among the possible endogenous determinants, we consider experience with the health system, sub-
jective health status, private insurance (only Germany), and political ideology (in Sweden) or political partisanship (in
Germany). The controls used in the models are selected because they are potentially linked to both satisfaction with
health services and with potential variance in the composition of respondents in the treatment and control groups
(Kohl & Wendt, 2004; Missinne, Meuleman, & Bracke, 2013; Wendt, Kohl, Mischke, & Pfeifer, 2010).3.4 | Estimation strategy
As discussed above, our data analysis strategy assumes an experimental research design, with all respondents ran-
domly assigned into the treatment or control groups. However, we do not have control over the randomization pro-
cedure (thus the quasi‐experimental nature of the analysis), and as such need to correct for any differences in the
886 BURLACU ET AL.treatment and control groups that might be driving differences in their satisfaction. An initial estimate of the imbal-
ance index shows significant differences in the socio‐economic characteristics between the control and treatment
groups in both German and Swedish samples (L‐index estimates in Tables 1 and 3). We adjust for these differences
in two different ways: (i) including the control variables in the regression models; and (ii) matching the control and
treatment samples before estimating the regression models. While a regression model does adjust for background var-
iables, it can bias the results in case there is no sufficient overlap between the treatment and control groups (Stuart,
2010, p. 2). As such, we also estimate the average treatment effect after coarsened exact matching. The matching
strategy can, nevertheless, suffer from bias due to incomplete (failure to match all treated units) or inexact (failure
to obtain exact matches) matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). As such, we present the results from the regression
models both before and after matching for comparison and cross‐validation (Rubin, 1974).
In the first part of the analysis, we estimate regression models of satisfaction variables as function of the treat-
ment variable and all control variables. In the analysis of the German data, we treat the 11‐point item as continuous
and implement OLS models to estimate how satisfaction differs across our independent variables. The coefficient of
the treatment variable thus indicates, on average, how satisfied are those in the treatment group compared to those in
the control group. For the analysis of the Swedish data, the satisfaction variables are categorical and thus we estimate
ordered probit instead of OLS models. Thus, we estimate the differences in the probability of being satisfied among
different groups. The coefficient of the treatment variable indicates in this case how likely or unlikely people in the
treatment group are to be satisfied compared to those in the control group.
In the second part of the analysis, we estimate the effect of treatment variable after matching the treatment and
control samples based on a set of socio‐economic background characteristics.9 We use coarsened exact matching,
which requires fewer assumptions and is more easily automated than other existing matching strategies. The matching
is done in three steps: (i) first the data is coarsened into substantively meaningful groups; (ii) then the treatment and
control groups are exactly matched based on these groups; and (iii) the analysis is done on the original (uncoarsened)
values of the matched data (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2009; Iacus, King, Porro, & Katz, 2012).10 As expected, the coarsened
exact matching technique reduces significantly the imbalance in the sample. In the German data, the imbalance index
is reduced from around 0.91–0.95 to 0.49–0.56, while in Sweden it is reduced from 0.67–0.61 to around 0.30–0.24
after machining (see L‐index inTables 1–4). This means that although the control and treatment groups are more sim-
ilar than before, there are still dissimilarities after matching. We correct those by including the socio‐economic char-
acteristics together with the treatment variable in the new regression models (Blackwell, Iacus, King, & Porro, 2010).4 | RESULTS
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present the results from the empirical investigation of the German and Swedish data, respec-
tively. We report results first from the initial regression model (Tables 1 and 3) and second from the regression anal-
ysis after the coarsened exact matching (Tables 2 and 4).4.1 | Germany
Table 1 includes the results from regression models of satisfaction with the German health system in general (models
1a and 1b), versus satisfaction with specific aspects of the health system, notably waiting time for an appointment
with a physician (models 4a and 4b). As we clearly see, only the satisfaction with the overall health system responds
to the introduction of the waiting time guarantee. The effect of the treatment on the other aspects of health care sat-
isfaction are small and statistically insignificant. The “a” series of models are regression models with all control vari-
ables, while the “b” series are the models including only the socio‐demographic control variables used in the
coarsened exact matching. We present both models to indicate that excluding the endogenous variables, for example,
self‐reported ideological position, does not alter the results substantially.
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TABLE 3 Ordered logit models of satisfaction with the services provided by the VGR, primary care, and hospital care
before matching using the Swedish Western SOM survey data
Services provided by the VGR Primary care Hospital care
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Treatment 0.439** (0.141) 0.394** (0.131) 0.158 (0.121) 0.045 (0.111) 0.120 (0.132) 0.053 (0.121)
Observations 1548 1692 2308 2531 2100 2298
L‐index 0.674 0.612 0.627
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.021 0.026 0.047 0.054 0.036
C_obs 1418 2136 1927
T_obs 274 395 371
Controls All SD All SD All SD
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
VGR: Västra Götland Region, SD: socio‐demographic control variables used also in matching.
Tables with the estimates of the control variables are presented in the Supporting Information.
TABLE 4 Ordered logit models of satisfaction with the services provided by the VGR, primary care, and hospital care
after matching using the Swedish Western SOM survey data
Services provided by the VGR Primary care Hospital care
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Treatment 0.307* 0.331* −0.037 −0.040 −0.085 −0.106
(0.153) (0.154) (0.121) (0.122) (0.134) (0.136)
Observations 816 816 1395 1395 1212 1212
L1 0.296 0.250 0.241
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.02 0.014 0.0001 0.0002 0.037
C_obs 603 1064 907
T_obs 213 331 305
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
VGR = Västra Götland Region.
Tables with the estimates of the control variables are presented in the Supporting Information.
BURLACU ET AL. 889Table 2 includes the results from regression models estimated after matching. The “a” model series comprises
bivariate regression models with only the treatment variable included, while the “b” series models include, additionally,
the socio‐demographic control variables used in the coarsened exact matching. Again, we see a clear treatment effect
of the introduction of the waiting time guarantee on satisfaction with the health system in general, but no effect on
other aspects of the health system. As in the initial regression model, the treatment coefficients from the coarsened
data are statistically significant only in models 1a and 1b, but not in the others. In the initial model, the increase in
overall satisfaction is estimated at almost 0.5 points, and after matching this is slightly higher. With a mean level of
satisfaction of 6.4 (6.7 after matching) and a standard deviation of 2.4 (2.1 after matching), the increase in satisfaction
is thus of substantive magnitude. Based on the results in model 1a in Table 2, the average predicted level of satisfac-
tion is of 6.30 in the control group and 6.94 in the treatment group. That means that after the reform, satisfaction
increased on average by 10%. The substantive effect is comparable to the difference in the satisfaction level of
890 BURLACU ET AL.Germany (5.92 points) and Estonia (5.27 points) on a 0–10‐point scale, respectively, in 2014, according to our own
calculations based on the European Social Survey.4.2 | Sweden
Table 3 presents the results from ordered logit models of satisfaction in Sweden before matching. As in the presen-
tation of the German data, the “a” series models include all control variables, while the “b” series include only the
socio‐demographics used in matching. The results show a significant effect of the treatment on the satisfaction with
the services provided by the Västra Götaland Region under both conditions (1a and 1b). However, as in the German
case, when asked about specific features of the health system, such as primary health care (2a/b) or hospital (3a/b)
services, respondents did not indicate increased satisfaction after introduction of the waiting time guarantee. Thus,
respondents report being more satisfied with the regional government after the introduction of the waiting time guar-
antee, but they do not indicate being more satisfied with health service delivery.
Table 4 includes the results from regression models after matching, the “a” series only with the treatment variable,
and the “b” series including also the socio‐demographic control variables used in the coarsened matching. As in the
previous sets of models and as in the German case, respondents report significantly higher levels of general
satisfaction after the introduction of the waiting time guarantee (models 1a/b), but report no increased satisfaction
regarding specifically primary (2a/b) or hospital care (3a/b). Based on the results in model 1a inTable 4, the probability
of being satisfied is of 38% in the control group and of 46% in the treatment group.11 The magnitude of the effect is
estimated as the average marginal change in the probability of being satisfied for people in the treatment and control
groups. We find that there is an increase of around 8% in the probability of being satisfied with the health system after
the reform is brought into force. The difference in satisfaction is comparable to the drop in overall satisfaction in
Sweden between 2012 (6.30 points) and 2014 (5.77 points), or between overall satisfaction in Sweden (5.77 points)
and Lithuania (5.06 points) on an 11‐point scale, respectively, in 2014, based on our own calculations with the
European Social Survey.5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The objective of this article was to study the impact of introduction of right‐based health care policy reforms on public
opinion, in this case, the impact of the German and Swedish waiting time guarantees on satisfaction with the health
system. Making use of a quasi‐experimental research design with unique survey data from both Germany and Swe-
den, we are able to identify the causal effect of the waiting time guarantees on satisfaction in a rigorous way. By com-
paring service satisfaction before (control group) and after (treatment group) the day the reforms were actually
implemented, and adjusting for imbalances in the composition of the groups, we show striking similarities in outcomes
in the German and Swedish context. Despite being implemented in two rather different health care systems and wel-
fare states—and with more than a decade between the reforms—the waiting time guarantee reforms resulted in an
immediate increase in the overall satisfaction with the health system in both Sweden and Germany. Furthermore, this
positive effect is in evidence even though waiting times were not shorter at the time of the surveys. Indeed, when
asked specifically about waiting times for a doctor's appointment (the aim of the German waiting time guarantee)
or for satisfaction with hospital treatment (the aim of the Swedish waiting time guarantee), respondents in both coun-
tries failed to note any increased satisfaction. Thus, we argue that this jump in overall satisfaction constitutes a nor-
mative effect: citizens approve of the way in which government is treating its commitment to provide health access to
its citizens, and appreciate this, even though they have not yet felt any improvement in service. It is, of course, the-
oretically possible that there was some other aspect of health service delivery that caused increased satisfaction that
was not included in our surveys, but it is highly improbable that this “omitted” variable went into effect on the same
day as the waiting time guarantees, and that this happened in two different countries, ruled by different governments,
BURLACU ET AL. 891and a decade apart. Furthermore, if the introduction of new rights never brings any improvement in service, there
could be a backlash. But, at least at the time of the introduction of these waiting time guarantees, we can show that
the public responded favorably to these new rights.
In conclusion, we suggest that we have identified an additional mechanism of policy feedback that we refer to as
the “recognition effect”. As we found this mechanism in health policy, an area of relatively stable attitudes, we expect
that this mechanism will be relevant for other areas of policy where new rights are recognized, and perhaps also in
cases where old grievances are acknowledged, such as in public apologies. We pointed out that the German and
Swedish governments made a notable effort to inform the public about these guarantees, but would claim that press
conferences, public relations, and even social media campaigns are becoming ever more common, such that one would
expect to find many additional instances of public awareness of new rights. Indeed, discussions of welfare state atti-
tudes have long theorized about the importance of norms as well as self‐interest (Gevers, Gelissen, Arts, & Muffels,
2000). However, as current research hones its methods to move beyond cross‐sectional models in order to focus
squarely on causal identification, the emphasis in the literature has become increasingly on mechanisms based on
self‐interest rather than norms. Here, we suggest that generalized diffuse support for welfare states may be a crucial
component of the political legitimacy of welfare states, and of governance in an age of austerity.
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ENDNOTES
1 The term “recognition” is inspired first by the attention paid by political philosophers to the politics of recognition as being
distinct from the politics of socio‐economic distribution, for example, Fraser (1995); Fraser and Honneth (2003); Taylor
(1997). For the welfare state area, the key work is undoubtedly Banting and Kymlicka (2006). Second, the discovery of
the recognition heuristic may indicate that human beings respond very strongly to recognition. We are not saying the rec-
ognition in the first sense—recognized as being sovereign—is necessarily buttressed by the cognitive effect, but it is a
possibility. See Gigerenzer (2001); Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002).
2 More information about SOEP and the SOEP Innovation Sample can be found in Richter and Schupp (2015); Wagner,
Frick, and Schupp (2007); and https://www.diw.de/soep (accessed July 15, 2017).
3 The SOM Institute is an independent survey research organization at the University of Gothenburg, more information can
be found at http://som.gu.se/som_institute.
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3knmeqoPwTw and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v‐KAwii9XaE (accessed
June 12, 2017).
5 “Så ska vi klara vårdgarantin i Västra Götaland” (“This is how we will fulfill the waiting time guarantee in Västra Götaland”)
Göteborgs‐Posten 2005–11‐01.
6 http://gesundheitsdaten.kbv.de/cms/html/24045.php, and http://www.kbv.de/html/418_26468.php (accessed August
17, 2017).
7 See Landsting (2007).
8 A question on waiting time was not available until subsequent surveys.
892 BURLACU ET AL.9 We do not coarsen based on attitudes, preferences, and values (e.g., ideological left–right placement), which could be
endogenous to satisfaction with the health system. First, we assume that the socio‐economic characteristics, which are
predictors of political attitudes and preferences, account for most of the variation in the endogenous variables of interest.
Second, including these variables in our matching strategy reduces significantly the number of matched treated units,
which as mentioned above, can lead to biased estimates.
10 For both the Swedish and German data, we use the default Sturge's rule approach, which coarsen the continuous variables
into a fixed number of bins, calculated using the formula: “[log2 n] + 1”, where n is the number of data points in the sample.
The only exception is the income variable in the German data, which is skewed to the right, and for this reason we coarsen
it according to different percentiles: 1, 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90.
11 The probability of being dissatisfied is 12% in the control group and 9% in the treatment group. The probability of saying
that they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied is 50% in the control group and 46% in the treatment group.
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